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Up to the 1960s, biochemistry and molecular biology were profoundly influenced by the deployment 
and diversity of a peculiar kind of research tool: mechanical molecular models (Francoeur, 1997, 2000). 
Although such physical models of molecular structures have been replaced by simulated or virtual 
models in modeling tasks (Francoeur & Segal, 2004), the building of scale models of molecular structures 
from tangible components was once an important part of the practice of biologically oriented chemists. 
This model-building strategy directly served the scientist’s research interests. The construction and 
manipulation of plastic, wooden and metallic models of possible molecular structures played a central 
part in an informed trial-anderror research strategy that proved especially useful in elucidating complex 
molecular structures such as those of organic macromolecules. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
chemist and biochemist Linus Pauling pioneered the systematic use of these “tinker toys” for the 
structural determination of compounds (e.g. Corey & Pauling, 1953), a research strategy historian of 
science Lily Kay has characterized as a “molecular architecture epistemology” (Kay, 1993, p. 262). This 
pervasive research strategy led to new scientific knowledge, including major breakthroughs, by 
stimulating the scientist’s imagination and pointing to new research avenues (Laszlo, 1993, 2000). 
Certainly the most famous example of such successful use of molecular models is James Watson’s and 
Francis Crick’s use of this research strategy in discovering the basic structure of the DNA molecule. The 
metallic model they used was not simply a dramatic display in an extravagant showcase: it was itself a 
tool for research and served as a locus for discovery. And this case is no anomaly—the use of such 
models for complex structural determination was typical rather than exceptional (Francoeur, 1997). 
 
Although nowadays these tangible models are seldom encountered outside undergraduate biochemistry 
courses, their historical importance as research tools guarantees their place in the standard iconography 
of science, making them familiar even to the layman. The role these physical models have played in 
scientific discovery has received little attention, with most scholarly focus being aimed to their 
supporting roles as pedagogical devices manipulated for better learning/memorization of a selected 
molecule’s structure or used as visual support in classrooms (e.g. Coll, 2006). Though the historian 
Robert Olby (1974) does mention here and there the use of such models, and describes in detail 
Pauling’s paper-made alpha-helix model (Olby, 1974, p. 208-201), there is no systematic discussion of 
the importance and role these physical models played—even though they did play a central role in 
paving the way for contemporary molecular biology. Philosophers have paid even less attention to these 
models but, when attended, the discussion centers on the more general aspects of representing and 
modeling (e.g. Giere, 2012), such as the scientists’ struggle with visualizing three-dimensionality by a 
two dimensional media (e.g. Francoeur, 1997; de Chadarevian & Hopwood, 2004; Gooding, 2006)). 
More generally, in the SEP entry on Models in Science, Frigg and Hartmann write about physical models 
that they “[…] do not give rise to any ontological difficulties over and above the well-known quibbles in 
connection with objects, which metaphysicians deal with.” (Frigg and Hartmann, 2012, section 2.1). 
From this latter perspective, there seems to be little more to physical models of molecular structures 
than a means to represent more accessibly the three-dimensional structure of a given molecule. 
 
The trouble with this view is that it does not account for the actual practice of using physical models as 
research tools nor for the manner by which new scientific knowledge is produced when doing so. When 
a modeler aims to solve a molecule’s structure with the aid of such physical models, she explores 
different combinations of model parts, makes measurements, often disassembling and reassembling the 
models built. These interactive manipulations exploit the mechanical properties of the models, 
properties which are not reducible to matters of visualization. Moreover, the use of these physical 
models has often replaced the deployment of mathematical calculations in molecular modeling 
contexts. This introduces a pragmatic dimension that cannot be ignored: when compared with 
geometrical drawings and mathematical calculations, physical models appear to be costly (in time, 
energy and money) and cumbersome replacements for clean paper work. I will argue here that 
mechanical molecular models are not just static representations, equivalent to flat geometrical and 
mathematical calculations with a three-dimensional twist; they have something more that makes them 
non-trivially different from their inscriptional counterparts. 
 
 The main claim of this paper is that mechanical molecular models (henceforth, ‘M-models’) were used 
as research tools that, through their mechanical properties, augment and extend the modeler’s 
cognitive capacities and performances. . Instead of relying on mathematical tools or solely on internal 
cognitive capacities, the architect manipulates these material props in such a way as to become more 
efficient in her problem solving. This is done by replacing extensive mathematical calculations by a 
different set of cognitive capacities such as visuospatial and haptic reasoning. Moreover, exploitation of 
the materiality of the M-model by informed manipulations on the part of the architect allows the M-
model to take an active part in the cognitive work required to solve a complex molecule’s structure. M-
models thus facilitate and extend the architects performances by integrating the inherent causality of 
the M-models materiality to serve as part of the cognitive process required to solve molecular modeling 
tasks. 
 
Moreover, I will argue that their component parts were designed, built and used to serve such cognitive 
functions. By an intelligent use of M-Models’ material properties, the molecular architect’s 
manipulations of the model parts enhanced her cognitive performances by facilitating the modeling 
task. This shows that, contrary to Frigg and Hartmann’s summary, there is more to the ontology of 
physical models than what has been led to believe by current philosophical investigations. Recasting M-
models as cognitive augmentations opens the way for a new horizon of research in the philosophy of 
science about the scientific uses of physical models. 
 
